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Oceans of Trouble: Domestic Influence on International Fisheries Cooperation in the 
North Atlantic and the Barents Sea 
 
Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir∗ 
 
Abstract 
 
How do states allocate joint fish stocks that straddle international boundaries?  What factors 
determine who gets what during international negotiations between fishing states?  These questions 
strike at the heart of the literature on international cooperation, and thus answering them will shed 
light not simply on international and transboundary fisheries management but also on the general 
challenges of international cooperation.  This paper examines how domestic groups influence 
negotiators and thus the ultimate terms of international agreements. The research focuses on seven 
agreements spanning 20 years signed by Norway and Iceland managing four shared fish stocks that 
straddle national and international waters. The main conclusion suggests that a state with a powerful 
domestic interest group usually gets a more favorable agreement when negotiating with a state with a 
weaker domestic interest groups.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Between 1980 and 1999, Iceland and Norway, along with other states, signed seven 
agreements aimed at dividing shared fish stocks.1 These seven agreements represent all the 
distributive agreements the two states have signed to allocate and manage four shared fish 
stocks: Icelandic capelin, Norwegian spring-spawning herring, Arctic cod, and deep-sea 
ocean perch. While the conflicts between Iceland and Norway have been solved and the 
solutions successfully implemented, these agreements vary greatly in how much each state 
gets allocated of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC),2 as shown in Table 1.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
This difference in the distributive outcomes of negotiations involving the same states, 
negotiating within the same issue area begs the question: What explains variation in 
allocation, which is found both across stocks, and in the case of capelin, over time? 
Answering this question empirically requires a close look at the actual bargaining process and 
the constraints negotiators face in reaching an agreement.  
When analyzing how states divide a common resource, the role of domestic politics is 
prominent. When negotiating fishing rights, the governments entering into agreements must 
consider the will of their own fishermen,3 who by and large are private actors. Any 
agreement on dividing shared fish stocks directly impacts the economic viability of these 
                                                          
∗ A number of institutions and people have assisted with this research project. Research support came from the 
Icelandic Research Council (Rannís), a NATO Basic Fellowship, the American-Scandinavian Foundation and 
the Agricultural Bank of Iceland. Among others, the author wishes to thank Andy Sobel, Roger Petersen, Jack 
Knight, Alf Håkon Hoel and Jennifer Seely for helpful comments on previous versions on this paper. In addition 
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers who provided constructive comments during the review process. This 
work is better because of them, but in the end any errors are wholly my responsibility. 
1. While all but one agreement involves other states, the focus here is on the interaction between Iceland and 
Norway as the two biggest fishing states bordering the North Atlantic. As the two key actors in the area it is 
clear that if Iceland and Norway fail to agree, there will be no agreement managing a stock.  
2. The Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is the quantity that can be taken from a stock each year. Ideally, the TAC 
should balance catch levels with long term viability of the stock.  
3. This article uses the term “fishermen” to refer to individuals involved in the capture fishery in Iceland and 
Norway. This term accurately represents the gender composition of the capture industry and its interest groups.  
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private interests. If government negotiators fail to accommodate the fishing industry, 
fishermen can render an agreement ineffective in two ways. First, fishermen can cheat. 
Because of the low marginal cost of fishing, the high cost of monitoring and enforcing 
agreements, and the lack of information about the resource, cheating is always going to be a 
threat to any agreement.  Second, fishermen can impose political costs on the government by 
protesting an agreement. 
Explaining the different distributive outcomes across stocks and over time will 
proceed on two levels. At the international level, it is usually clear from the beginning of the 
negotiations which state should get the largest share of the resource. As “Section 3—The 
Role of International Law” shows, this decision is based on whether or not the participating 
state is a coastal state and where most of the stock resides. However, these principles cannot 
explain the choice of a solution concept that serves as a baseline for allocation, a decision 
crucial to explaining the final distributive outcome. At the international level, the Law of the 
Sea regime provides states with solution concepts, such as historical rights or scientific 
considerations, that they can apply to allocate straddling stocks. Each negotiating round 
entails choosing a solution concept to determine a baseline for the distribution of a stock as 
explained in “Section 4—How Domestic Politics Matter.” The selection of a baseline affects 
the final distributive outcome of the negotiations and thus has significant economic 
consequences for domestic fishermen.  
Departing from other accounts of domestic sources of international cooperation, 
which emphasize institutional variation such as legislative ratification constraining 
negotiators, I argue that societal factors—specifically organized interest groups—provide the 
important bargaining constraints for negotiators.4 I show that interest group presence on the 
negotiating committee directly affects the selection of a baseline and thus impact the 
distributive outcome of the negotiations. Interest groups in Iceland and Norway representing 
the fisheries are crucial players in the bargaining process at two time-points. First, prior to 
entering negotiations, government officials meet with interest group leaders to decide what 
negotiators will ask for in the negotiations and what they can accept as a counteroffer. 
Second, interest groups have representatives on the actual negotiating committees, and can 
thus discuss offers and counteroffers as they are presented.  
However, interest group presence on the delegation is not enough to ensure influence 
on the choice of a baseline. Ultimately the power of the interest group vis-à-vis the 
government impacts the interest groups ability to get what it wants. That is, a powerful 
interest group will have a better chance of constraining the government delegation than a 
weak interest group. More constraints translate into a narrower bargaining space, which gives 
the government less freedom to make and receive offers without consideration of the interest 
group. But in the case of a weak interest group, government delegates will have a freer reign 
to accept and receive offers to achieve the goal of solving a conflict, without having to worry 
about possible domestic political costs. Hence a change in the relative bargaining power 
between interest groups and government officials domestically affects the ability of interest 
groups to constrain government negotiators in the international arena. An interest group that 
is losing power is less constraining for negotiators as it is less able to threaten political 
problems when interest group does not like the deals the government is proposing at the 
international level.  
                                                          
4. A constraint on a negotiator translates into bargaining strength for the constrained nation as it narrows the 
bargaining space and thus allows a negotiator to reject offers by citing domestic concerns over the offer. See for 
example Putnam and Bayne 1984; Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993; Mo 1994, 1995; Milner 
1997; Martin 2000; and Tarar 2001. 
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Specifically, Icelandic interest groups have remained powerful domestically 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, while a decline in power of the key Norwegian interest 
group has made it less able to secure favorable policy outcomes in its dealings with the 
Norwegian government. At the international level these changes in power domestically have 
led to Iceland increasingly getting a better deal than Norway in negotiations over allocation 
of shared fish stocks.  
This paper proceeds in the following manner.  First, I discuss the theoretical literature 
on the domestic sources of international cooperation.  Second, I discuss how the Law of the 
Sea influences the outcome of negotiations. I then move on to the empirical study of the 
negotiations between Iceland and Norway, where highly organized and involved interest 
groups set constraints on negotiators before and during international negotiations. In this 
section, I discuss the source of interest group power, as well as how the power and ability to 
influence policy has changed over time. Finally, I show how interest group participation in 
the negotiations has influenced the selection of the baseline for the negotiations, which in 
turn influences the distribution of catch allocations.  
 
2. Bargaining Constraints and Political Costs 
 
Theories of how domestic politics influence international cooperation have proliferated in 
recent years.5 But a generalizable theory has not emerged as to who and what helps or 
hinders states in the bargaining process. Scholars have pointed to an electoral connection,6 
ratification procedures7 and the role of domestic constraints, specifically veto players8 as 
influencing the outcome. 
In the case of Iceland and Norway, electoral considerations have not influenced the 
distributive outcome of the negotiations. Upcoming elections in Iceland seem to have made 
the 1999 cod agreement possible, but the elections did not influence the actual distributive 
outcome. Furthermore, formal ratification by the legislature cannot explain the variance in the 
distributive outcomes of the negotiations between Iceland and Norway either. Formal 
ratification procedures are thought to constrain the bargaining space, i.e. the room negotiators 
have to reach an agreement. Required ratification has been shown to lead to a better result for 
the state that has a formal ratification procedure.9 In the case of Iceland and Norway there is 
no evidence that legislative ratification matters for the negotiating outcome.  
The third strand of research on domestic influence on international cooperation 
focuses on the role of domestic constraints in defining the bargaining space. Broadly 
speaking these constraints can be thought of as veto players, defined as individuals or 
institutions whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo.10 The status quo in 
this case being unregulated fishing. Jongryn Mo argues that domestic pressure can constrain a 
negotiator, and the level of constraint depends on the distribution of power between the 
negotiator and the domestic interests.11 In a later paper, Mo argues that negotiators can 
impose domestic constraints on themselves by granting veto power to an agent (e.g. an 
interest group).12 His model also finds that if the preferences of the agent and the bureaucrat 
differ too greatly, the agent will not get veto power. There is evidence of this happening once 
                                                          
5. Putnam and Bayne 1984; Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993; Mo 1994, 1995; Milner 1997; 
Martin 2000; and Tarar 2001. 
6. Putnam and Bayne 1984. 
7. Milner 1997; and Martin 2000. 
8. Mo 1994, 1995; and Tarar 2001. 
9. Milner 1997. 
10. Tsebelis 1995, 1999. 
11. Mo 1994. 
12. Mo 1995. 
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in the negotiations between Iceland and Norway. By having interest groups as an integral part 
of the negotiating committee, both Iceland and Norway narrow their bargaining space and 
thus restrict their alternatives to make and accept offers. But in the case of the 1999 cod 
agreement, the two governments decided to leave the interest groups out of the negotiation 
committees because their preferences were too far away from the preferences of the 
government, especially in Norway.  
All of the above work has one fundamental shortcoming in that it looks only at what 
happens when one state is constrained by domestic factors in the negotiations. The other state 
in the bargaining process is assumed not to have any constraints at all. Tarar extends the work 
on the impact of domestic constraints on distributive outcomes and develops a model where 
both states have domestic constraints on their ability to make and accept offers.13 He shows 
that if one negotiator has high domestic constraints while the other negotiator only has 
moderate or low constraints, the highly constrained negotiator will have a bargaining 
advantage when bargaining with a less constrained party. Tarar’s result is applicable to the 
negotiations between Iceland and Norway. It is clear from the evidence that Iceland is more 
constrained by its powerful interest groups than Norway, whose key interest group loses 
power in the 1980s and 1990s. These factors have a direct influence on the outcome, giving 
Iceland a bargaining edge against Norway.  
Bargaining constraints can be defined as a negotiator’s ability to receive and make 
offers. That is, at the beginning of negotiations, most states have a mechanism to decide how 
much they are willing to offer and how much they are willing to settle for in order to reach an 
agreement. How the bargaining space, i.e. the maximum a state is willing to offer and the 
minimum it is willing to accept, is determined domestically varies among states. For 
example, it can include meetings with stakeholders, such as the relevant interest groups or 
key members of the legislatures. The goal of having a defined bargaining space at the outset 
of international negotiations is to minimize domestic political costs once an agreement is 
reached.  
Domestic political cost to politicians can come in three forms. First, if the 
dissatisfaction with an agreement is widespread, it can potentially lessen the ability of 
politicians to be reelected. Second, politicians have limited time and having to spend a 
significant amount of time and energy defending an international agreement takes away from 
the time they could spend on more fruitful political pursuits. Finally, disagreement and 
opposition to an agreement, especially among key stakeholders, makes enforcement and 
hence compliance more difficult, especially if private interests are asked to curb profitable 
behavior. 
 
3. The Role of International Law 
 
As discussed above, the first level of the explanation over the variation in distributive 
outcomes lies at the international level. Scholars studying international cooperation have 
argued that the existence of international regimes fosters cooperation.14 The “United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea” and “The Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks,” form the Law of the Sea regime that governs oceans and fisheries.15 
Regimes are defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
                                                          
13. Tarar 2001. 
14. Krasner 1983; Young 1989; and Young 1999. 
15. In the interest of space, the latter will henceforth be referred to as the Straddling Stocks Agreement.  
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international relations.”16 However, while regimes promote cooperation, they do not dictate 
the nature of the cooperation, i.e. who should get what and on which grounds. For example, 
the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which concluded in 1982, 
and the subsequent 1995 Straddling and Highly Migratory Stocks Agreement lay out broad 
solution concepts that states can use to negotiate a baseline to allocate common resources. 
Iceland and Norway have signed both agreements, making them binding.  
However, while the agreements mandate cooperation, they do not dictate which 
solution concept should be adopted and therefore they cannot explain the variance in the 
distributive outcome. Participating states have absolute power to decide how they use the 
guidelines found in the Law of the Sea, as described below. They therefore use the law in an 
instrumental fashion, focusing on the solution concepts that will give each state the largest 
share of the resource being divided amongst them. Different baselines will yield different 
proportions of a shared stock as discussed later. But neither agreement discusses how these 
guidelines should be translated into an actual percentage distribution of a particular stock. 
Interviews with bureaucrats and interest group leaders in Norway and Iceland indicate 
that the role of international law emerges as providing solution concepts for cooperation and 
thus narrows the number of possible outcomes.17 That is, states act instrumentally to 
maximize their share of the Total Allowable Catch. The interviews with participants in the 
negotiations reveal three primary solution concepts that have reference in the 1982 United 
Nations Law of the Sea and the recent Straddling Stocks Agreement signed in 1995.  
First, Article 63 of the 1982 Law of the Sea calls for cooperation among coastal states 
and high-seas fishing states in managing straddling fish stocks.18 This duty to cooperate is 
reinforced in Article 5(a) of the 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement.19 Taken together, the 
Law of the Sea regime provides for the rights and responsibilities of coastal states and high-
seas fishing states in managing straddling stocks. If a fish stock is found partially within the 
waters of a country, that country is a coastal state. If a country has no traces of a stock in its 
waters, but its ships partake in the fishery in international waters, it is labeled a high-seas 
fishing state. The overarching principle of the Law of the Sea is that coastal states are 
responsible for the maintenance of stocks, while high-seas fishing states have an obligation 
not to deplete a particular stock. Interviews reveal that in practice this principle means that in 
most agreements, coastal states have the right to a larger share of the stock than a high-seas 
fishing state.  
Second, states can use the concept of zonal attachment20 to allocate shared resouces. 
Article 5 of the Straddling Stock Agreement argues that management measures should be 
based on the best scientific evidence available and the calculation of zonal attachment is a 
scientific construct which estimates how much of the stock is found within a particular 
                                                          
16. Krasner 1983, p. 2. 
17. Twenty-seven individuals were interviewed for this study, 11 in Iceland in the fall of 1998 and 16 in Norway 
during the summer of 1999. Interviewees included bureaucrats and interest groups leaders who collectively have 
been part of all the negotiations between Iceland and Norway for the past 20 years. Given the small number of 
interviewees and the sensitivity of some of the negotiations, most interviewees requested their identity be kept 
secret. The questions asked were similar across all interviewees, focusing on the negotiating process, how 
nations decide their bargaining positions, who gets to participate, what the relationship between the different 
actors was and so forth. In summarizing the interviews, care has been taken to focus on answers to questions 
that were echoed by two or more interviewees.  
18.  United Nations 1982. 
19.  United Nations 1995. 
20. Zonal attachment is a scientific construct which estimates how much on average of a straddling stock is 
found within each Exclusive Economic Zone. If used as a basis for allocation it is a straightforward concept for 
allocation that is the least political of the possible allocation mechanisms. One thing to remember is that not all 
stocks have enough information available in order for zonal attachment to be calculated. That is the case with 
oceanic redfish, a relatively recent fishery far from shore and thus understudied scientifically.  
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economic zone at any given time.21 Ideally, using zonal attachment to divide a stock reduces 
the politics involved in the allocation if everyone party to the negotiations agrees with the 
calculations. That is, if governments accepted scientific calculations where stocks reside as 
basis for distribution, there would really be no need for negotiations. However, zonal 
attachment often complements the coastal state provision, i.e. who should get the largest 
share, but is rarely strictly applied, because goverments like to have the flexbility to negotiate 
a different allocation.  
Finally, provision 62(3) of the 1982 Law of the Sea suggests that states have to 
repsect historical rights to fisheries.22 This provision is the most politically malleable 
provision in the negotiations being studied here, and as such enjoys vast popularity. The 
ability to rely on the provision that allows for more negotiations, allows negotiators to 
bargain harder and try to get more of the resource than strict zonal attachment would dictate. 
Historical rights is an elastic concept as there are often heated discussions about when history 
should “begin” and to what extend such rights should matter in the final allocation. Hence, 
historical rights have emerged as the baseline for allocation  most of the negotiations in this 
study.  
 
4. How Domestic Politics Matter 
 
The influence of domestic constraints on the negotiations is crucial when it comes to 
explaining the choice of a particular solution concept as a baseline for the final distributive 
outcome.  It is clear that the size of the domestic constraint, can and does change over time in 
such a way that it influences the choice of a baseline and thus the final allocation. In the 
actual negotiations, the choice of a baseline is primarily between the use of zonal attachment 
and historical rights. The decision between them is a political decision based on domestic 
considerations, framed by the relevant interests groups party to nearly all the negotiations. 
Entering negotiations, each state tries to push for a solution that yields the most amount of 
stock, based on considerations of coastal states, zonal attachment and historical rights. During 
the negotiations, however, the negotiators adjust these preferences to achieve an agreement 
and one solution concept emerges as the baseline for distribution of the straddling stock. For 
example, during the herring negotiations, considerations of the historical rights of Iceland 
granted it a bigger share than zonal attachment would have, while zonal attachment has 
dominated capelin agreements. Table 2 shows the initial preferences for Iceland and Norway 
at the beginning of each negotiating round.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In all cases, Iceland and Norway initially prefer different baselines for allocating the 
stocks. The individual baselines were decided upon domestically through discussions with the 
relevant interest groups, prior to the international negotiations. The decision is based on 
which solution will yield the biggest share of the catch for fishermen. As the last column of 
the table shows, the outcome is that Iceland usually gets its way. This finding begs the 
question of why Iceland’s position is so strong? The answer lies in the domestic constraints 
the two states face during the negotiating process. The key constraint in both Iceland and 
Norway is the interest groups representing the fisheries. These groups are key actors in both 
countries, the important difference being that their ability to influence the process is not equal 
in the two countries and, more importantly, it has changed over time. 
  
                                                          
21.  United Nations 1995. 
22.  United Nations 1982. 
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5. Interest Groups as Pivotal Players 
 
Analysis of the interviews reveals that interest groups are crucial players in the negotiating 
process and, as such, influence who gets what. Interest groups play a prominent role in the 
actual negotiating process at two stages – in preparation for the negotiations and during the 
negotiations. Having a delegate on the actual negotiating committees grants interest groups 
the power to suggest solutions and prevent unfavorable solutions from being adopted. That is, 
they essentially act as veto players. In all but two cases—the 1996 herring agreement and the 
1999 cod agreement—interest groups had members on the actual negotiating committees. In 
1996, the key Norwegian interest group—Norges Fiskarlag—withdrew from the herring 
negotiations. In the case of cod, following a breakdown of these negotiations in 1996, interest 
groups were excluded from both sides because of strong interest group opposition in Norway 
to any agreement with Iceland.  
The fact that Norges Fiskarlag left the herring negotiations meant that the Norwegian 
government was freer to reach an agreement with the states party to the agreement as the 
declining importance of Norges Fiskarlag meant that the government did not have to worry 
about political fallout from the agreement. During the cod negotiations, when interest groups 
from both sides were excluded from the delegations, interviews indicate that the Icelandic 
interest groups were better informed of developments than Norges Fiskarlag, which had no 
access to information about the negotiations.  
Interest groups exercise their influence on the negotiating process before and during 
negotiations, but are powerless to alter the outcome afterward. Before negotiations begin, the 
governments in both countries consult with the interest group about goals of the negotiations. 
My interviewees on the government side in both countries described the pre-negotiation 
meetings as crucial to formulating their respective negotiating positions. In addition, interest 
groups have representatives on the actual delegation representing the countries.  
There are two similarities in interest group influence and one significant difference in 
how the interviewees perceive the direct interest group influence on the negotiating process 
in Iceland and Norway. First, bureaucrats in both states agree that having the interest groups 
along was very important for the negotiations, both to provide information on the specifics of 
the fisheries as well as a contact point to vet ideas about possible solutions to the conflict. By 
being present, the interest groups can effectively veto suggestions as they arise. This is 
especially true with the Icelandic delegation. The main difference between Iceland and 
Norway in this respect is that the interest groups in Iceland are a more integral part of the 
process than they are in Norway. “Interest groups have a great deal of influence on the 
Icelandic strategy,” one Icelandic official said. A Norwegian official, however, pointed out 
that it did not matter if the interest groups did not like an agreement. They had to accept what 
the government did.23 
Second, interest group leaders interviewed indicated that they thought they could 
influence the outcome of international negotiations, but the Icelandic interest group leaders 
were more confident about their ability to directly influence the outcome of the negotiations. 
“Our role in negotiations is to be advisers to the bureaucrats,” an Icelandic interest group 
leader said. “It is normal that the government considers our position, otherwise we would not 
participate in the process.”24 
                                                          
23.  Personal interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat. Interview conducted in Norway, May 5, 1999. 
24.  Personal interview with an Icelandic interest group leader. Interview conducted in Iceland, December 12, 
1998. 
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Third, interest group leaders and bureaucrats in both countries agreed that once an 
agreement is reached, interest groups have no official avenues to protest an agreement. As 
one Norwegian official put it: “They can’t go on strike, they can’t stop fishing.” 25 
 
6. The Power to Influence the Policy Process 
 
Interest groups representing fisheries are major actors within the domestic policy arena and 
their influence spills over into the international arena. In both Iceland and Norway, the 
fishing industry is highly organized with participation being practically universal. In Norway, 
the key group is Norges Fiskarlag, while in Iceland the key group is the Association of 
Icelandic Vessel Owners, which participates in negotiations along with three labor unions. By 
having interest group representatives on the actual delegation, government officials seek to 
minimize the political cost once an agreement is reached. Norwegian and Icelandic interest 
groups, however, differ in their ability to influence their respective government and their 
ability to influence the outcome has changed over time. This different ability has direct 
consequences for the outcome of the international negotiations, most notably by giving 
Iceland the upper hand in setting the baseline for the division of stocks, which has led to 
favorable outcome for Iceland, as evident in Table 2. As Tarar shows, a country with a highly 
constrained bargaining space usually gets a better deal in negotiations, in this case a higher 
percentage of the TAC, than a country with a less constrained bargaining space.26 However, 
in the case of Iceland and Norway, the constraints on negotiators have not remained constant 
over time and the change in power of the interest groups has influenced the choice of baseline 
and thus the final allocation. The power of Norges Fiskarlag has been weakening during the 
past 25 years, resulting in lessening ability to influence the Norwegian government. As a 
result it has become easier for the Norwegian government to ignore Norges Fiskarlag’s 
preferences. The Icelandic interest groups have, at minimum, retained their influence. This is 
especially true for the Vessel Owners, who to an extent dictate policy both domestically and 
at the international level.  
 
Norway 
 
Norwegian fishing interests are highly organized, the most important group being Norges 
Fiskarlag (The Norwegian Association of Fishermen). It is unique in that it represents often 
competing interests of fishing vessels and the fishermen working on the vessels. The glue that 
has kept Norges Fiskarlag together since 1964 has been annual governmental subsidies to the 
fishermen. Norges Fiskarlag was given a monopoly on negotiating these subsidies with the 
government, which meant that if a group wanted to influence the negotiations, it had to join 
the organization. The subsidies ensured fishermen’s incomes and supported settlement in the 
northern regions. They reached their peak in the early 1980s, but have since all but 
disappeared. Norges Fiskarlag has also exercised its influence by negotiating fisheries policy 
with the government and by being able to influence appointments to important posts in the 
fisheries sector. The organization’s position has also been helped by its perceived political 
alliance with Norway’s most powerful political party, the Labor Party.27  
The power of the Norwegian fishing industry derives from the regional importance of 
the industry. Fishing is primarily an export industry with about 90% of the products exported, 
making it the second largest export industry in the country. This figure may sound 
impressive, but the fact is that fisheries products only comprise about 7% of Norwegian 
                                                          
25.  Personal interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat. Interview conducted in Norway, May 5 1999.  
26. Tarar 2001. 
27. Sagdahl 1982. 
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exports.28 However, two regions stand out as centers for the industry, the three northernmost 
counties (Nordland, Troms and Finnmark) and the west coast (Møre-Romsdal). During the 
Cold War, Norwegian policy makers spent a great deal of effort and money to keep Northern 
Norway populated, arguing that any significant depopulation would have made Norway more 
vulnerable to Soviet influence, maybe even an invasion.  
Norges Fiskarlag’s ability to influence the policy process has declined during the past 
25 years. This decline has its roots in three main developments. The number of fishermen has 
declined, oil production has become increasingly important to the Norwegian economy, and 
the end of the Cold War lessened the importance of the northern regions of Norway, 
diminishing their political influence. These changes are reflected in drastically reduced 
subsidies as well as diminished interests by Norwegian parliamentarians in fisheries issues.  
 
i. The Number of Fishermen: There has been a steady reduction in the number of fishermen 
in Norway since the end of World War II. The number of fishermen was at its peak just after 
World War II, when there were about 98,000 fishermen in Norway.29 In 1962, about 56,900 
fishermen caught 1.3 million tons of fish. Due to technological innovation, the total number 
of fishermen was about 23,600 and the catch had doubled to 2.5 million tons of fish by 
1995.30 From 1984 to 1998, the number of full-time fishermen decreased by about 30%, from 
about 22,000 in 1984 to about 15,000 in 1998. This decline has geographic dimensions. The 
north, the traditional Labor stronghold and the center of the Norwegian fishing industry, has 
lost ground against the industrialized west-coast fleet. This has reduced the direct political 
impact of fishermen.  
 
 ii. End of the Cold War: During the Cold War, Norway pursued a policy of limited 
cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea, while at the same time keeping 
Western allies from entering the area in any great numbers.31 The fall of the Soviet Union 
had important consequences for Northern Norway. Once the dust settled after the collapse, 
the northern regions of Norway had lost some of their political importance, as the risk of 
Russian invasion seemed slim. This further marginalized the North politically, as the center 
of the Norwegian fishing industry.  
 
iii. Oil Makes a Splash: The composition of Norwegian exports has undergone a fundamental 
change in the past 35 years and Norway has become a major oil producer and exporter, with 
oil overtaking traditional industries as the leading source of export earnings. The exports of 
crude oil and natural gas increased from 2.2% of total exports in 1970 to about 48% of the 
total in 1995. Meanwhile, fishing exports have remained relatively constant at about 5-9% of 
total exports. The development of the oil industry has shifted the attention of politicians away 
from fisheries, and lessened the relative economic importance of the fisheries.  
 
iv. Role of Subsidies: The decrease in the number of fishermen, the increased importance of 
the oil sector combined with the end of the Cold War, has lessened the ability of Norges 
Fiskarlag to secure concessions from the government, evident in the elimination of subsidies 
to secure fishermen’s incomes. While the original reason for the elimination of subsidies was 
a domestic decision, their eventual abolishment was cemented in 1993 when Norway signed 
the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement with the European Union. The change in 
subsidies can be seen in Figure 1. 
                                                          
28. Norges Fiskarlag 1998. 
29. Fløistad 1982. 
30. Norsk Fiskerinæring 1996.  
31. Tamnes 1997. 
 10 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
  
Subsidies to the fishing industry increased steadily until the early 1980s. This began to 
change in 1983 with a new right-wing government that wanted to make the fishing industry 
self-sufficient. For the first time since 1964, the annual negotiations over the amount of 
subsidies broke down. They broke down again in 1984, 1986, 1989 and 1995. In all but one 
case, Norges Fiskarlag left the negotiations because of dissatisfaction with the government’s 
offer, while the Labor government broke them off in 1986. In the context of Norwegian 
electoral politics, one would have expected breakdowns to happen only during times of right-
wing governments. The fishing regions in the north have traditionally been Labor Party 
strongholds and the party has been supportive of subsidies. But looking at government 
composition during these breakdowns reveals that in 1982, 1983 and 1989, there was a right-
wing coalition governing Norway, while the Labor Party was in government in 1986 and 
1995. This indicates that fisheries interests were losing the ability to influence even the Labor 
Party, its traditional ally.  
  
v. Diminishing Interest in the Storting: The decline in the importance of the fisheries sector 
detailed above has translated into less interest in fisheries issues in the Storting. Since 1977, 
there has been a steady decline in the number of items relating to the fisheries that come 
before the Storting. Figure 2 shows the change in the total number of items brought before 
the parliament pertaining to the fisheries. The Lowess smoother shows the trend over time.32  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The figure shows a clear downward trend in parliamentary interest. The slight 
increase in the late 1970s in the number of items can be attributed to the expansion of the 
200-mile EEZ. The new zone required changes in numerous domestic regulations to ensure 
Norwegian control over the economic zone. In the 1980s, the number of issues leveled off 
and reduced slightly, but in the late 1980s the reduction accelerated, indicating that the 
parliament had shifted its focus elsewhere.  
 
Iceland 
 
The organizational structure of the fishing industry is very different in Iceland from Norway 
and interaction between the government and the interest groups much tighter and more 
informal. Four main organizations are consulted and participate on behalf of the fisheries in 
international negotiations. The most powerful organization is The Federation of Icelandic 
Fishing Vessel Owners, which represents owners of ships larger than 40 feet. The other three 
groups are labor unions: The Association of Icelandic Marine Engineer, which represents 
machinists on ships; Merchant Navy and Fishing Vessels Officers Guild, representing 
captains and first mates; and the Icelandic Seamen’s Federation, representing fishermen. 
While the three labor unions are also consulted on all matters pertaining to the fishing 
industry, their influence does not match the influence of the Vessel Owners.  
The power of the Icelandic fishing industry, especially the Vessel Owners, stems from 
its economic dominance. Fish and fish-related products comprise the majority of Iceland’s 
export earnings. Fish products have declined from being about 95% of the total value of 
                                                          
32 A Lowess smoother is a smoothing function for scatter plots to show the general trend in the data. The 
acronym stands for “locally weighted least squares” and the line represents a locally weighted regression based 
on neighboring values to each point in the graph.  
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Icelandic exports in 1960 to averaging about 75% during the past 30 years. This dominance 
has given the industry access to policy-making and, according to some scholars, the ability to 
dictate policy.33  
Given the importance of the fisheries for the Icelandic economy, the government has 
shown great willingness to cater to the fishing industry evident in its handling of two major 
issues over the past 20 years. First, by manipulating currency prices through frequent 
devaluations, the Icelandic government aided this crucial export industry. Second, the 
industry—and especially the Vessel Owners—significantly influenced all major changes in 
fisheries policy. This was especially evident in the major policy change in the Icelandic 
fisheries during the past 20 years, the adoption of the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) 
system, which essentially privatized a common resource.  
 
 i. The Politics of Currency Valuation: Until 1993, the price of the Icelandic currency was 
decided by the cabinet and changes were carried out by the Central Bank of Iceland. The 
government used this power to help the fishing industry by devaluing the Krona during 
economic slowdowns as the devaluations increased the export earnings of the industry.34 The 
policy of devaluation to aid the fishing industry was one of the main tools the government 
used to manipulate the economy, and between 1977 and 1993 the Icelandic currency was 
devalued 21 times.35 While the export industry benefited, this policy contributed to rising 
price levels domestically.  
 
ii. The System of Individual Transferable Quotas: The second policy issue that reveals the 
power of the Vessel Owners on the Icelandic policy-making process is the adoption of the 
system of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) in the early 1980s to manage the declining 
Icelandic fisheries. During the process of deciding which management regime to adopt the 
Vessel Owners played an important role. They were deeply involved in designing, 
implementing and adjusting a new system of ITQs.36 Interest groups representing the various 
aspects of the Icelandic fishing industry also participated in the process, but the Vessel 
Owners were the crucial interests to the adoption of the ITQ system and their role was 
indicative of their power in the development of fisheries policy in Iceland. Steingrímur 
Hermannsson, prime minister during the period when the ITQ system was established, 
confirms the enormous power of the Vessel Owners in his autobiography. He says that the 
ITQ system was almost entirely designed by the Vessel Owners with the full support of the 
Minister of Fisheries.37 There is little indication that the power of the Vessel Owners has 
diminished since the 1980s.  
 
iii. Number of Fishermen: As discussed above, the influence of the Vessel Owners on 
Icelandic political life derives from its economic importance. As in Norway the number of 
fishermen has declined, but the decline has been at a much slower pace than in Norway. In 
1977 there were 5,319 fishermen employed in Iceland. In 1997 the number was down to 
4,582 or a reduction of 14%. But there is no strong connection between the industry and 
specific political parties, as there is in Norway. Therefore, fewer votes are likely to be 
distributed across the political spectrum. 
 
                                                          
33. Jónsson 1990. 
34. Thjóðhagsstofnun 1988; and Committee on the Formation of Fisheries Policy 1993. 
35. Thjóðhagsstofnun 1988, 1993 and 1996. 
36. Jónsson 1990. 
37. Eggertsson 1999. 
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iv. Increased interest in the Althing: The continued importance of the fishing industry can 
also be seen in the Althing, the Icelandic parliament. Figure 3 shows the trend in the number 
of laws passed originating from the cabinet dealing with the fisheries.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
The overall trend in the number of cabinet proposals is upward, indicating that the 
cabinet is increasingly preoccupied with fisheries issues. There is a dip in activity in the late 
1980s following the flurry of changes accompanying the introduction of the ITQ system in 
the early 1980s. The increase in the 1990s is related to further adjustment of Icelandic 
fisheries management and expansion of the ITQ system. The Icelandic parliamentary data 
show that politicians pay a lot of attention to the fisheries, with about 10% of all cabinet 
proposals passed dealing with fisheries related issues. This indicates that the Icelandic 
fisheries have at minimum retained their influence on policy making. In comparison with 
Norway, it is clear that the Icelandic fisheries play a much larger role in parliamentary affairs.  
This shows that Icelandic interest groups have at minimum retained their power and 
hence their ability to influence the policy making in Iceland is significant. However, the 
relationship between Norges Fiskarlag and the Norwegian government has changed 
fundamentally and as a result, the interest group finds it increasingly difficult to influence the 
government position in the negotiations and by extension influence the distributive outcome.  
 
7. The Impact of Interest Groups During the Negotiations 
 
This section discusses the negotiations and the differing role of interest groups in the seven 
negotiations over time and across stocks. The main conclusion is that interest groups 
constrain negotiators, but that these constraints change over time. Interest groups have 
remained powerful to influence Icelandic negotiators, while the weakening position of 
Norges Fiskarlag has led to lessening constraints on the Norwegian negotiators. This change 
in relative power of the interest groups has influenced the choice of a baseline for the final 
distribution of TACs between the two states, increasingly giving Iceland the most favorable 
outcome.  
 
Capelin 
 
Norwegian and Icelandic negotiators reached the first agreement over fishing of capelin in 
the Jan Mayen area on May 10th 1980. In 1984 it was time to go back to the negotiation table, 
this time to add Greenland to the agreement and achieve complete management of the stock. 
It took more than six years to hammer out an agreement. The third agreement was negotiated 
in 1998 after Iceland cancelled the 1989 agreement on behest of the Vessel Owners. The 
subsequent negotiations resulted in a smaller share for Norway. Since the first agreement in 
1980, the Norwegian share of the capelin stock has declined from 15% to 8% of the TAC, or 
nearly 47%.  
The role of interest groups was significant in all three negotiating rounds, but over 
time Norges Fiskarlag has lost its ability to influence the Norwegian negotiators, resulting in 
a smaller share for Norwegian fishermen. The first division of the stock in 1980 was heavily 
influenced by interest groups, and they were powerful on both sides. Initially, Icelandic 
interest groups did not want Norway to get more than 10% of the TAC, while Norges 
Fiskarlag pushed to get 20%. The bargaining space for the Icelandic negotiators was further 
restricted by the fact that the Icelandic interest groups opposed any agreement with the 
Norwegians and the fact that the Icelandic coalition government was not united behind the 
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negotiations. The Socialist Party vehemently opposed any agreement that did not give Iceland 
rights to unilaterally determine the TAC for capelin each year.38 This gave Iceland a stronger 
hand, but despite this, the Norwegians got 15% of the stock. This can be considered a fair 
share for Norway, which until then had been catching about 12-15% of the stock each year. 
At this time, Norges Fiskarlag was at the peak of its power as the oil sector was still 
developing, the Cold War was alive and well, and the organization enjoyed plenty of political 
attention and high subsidies.  
The ink was barely dry on the 1980 agreement when it became clear that complete 
management of the capelin stock was impossible without incorporating Greenland. In order 
to facilitate an agreement, Iceland and Norway had to agree to give up a share of their capelin 
fishery. The key issue was how much of their respective quotas the Norwegian and Icelandic 
fishermen had to relinquish. Delegations representing the three countries agreed that the 
division of the stock should be based upon scientific data on zonal attachment. This 
agreement is the first agreement in which zonal attachment provides the baseline for the 
distribution of the TAC. A 1985-6 scientific report supported by all participants showed that 
between 75% and 80% of the capelin stock was in the Icelandic zone.39 On the basis of this 
report, Iceland demanded 80% of the quota. The starting point for Norway in the negotiations 
was that Norway and Iceland should give proportional amounts of their respective quotas to 
Greenland. This plan called for Norway and Greenland to get 13% each, leaving Iceland with 
a 74% share.40 In the end Norway and Greenland got 11% each, leaving Iceland with 78% of 
the stock.41 Iceland did not give up much from the previous allocation. Its share of the TAC 
was cut only about 9% while the Norwegian share went down 27%. In the mid to late 1980s, 
Norges Fiskarlag had an increasingly hostile relationship with the Norwegian government, 
which had successfully cut subsidies to the industry. Increasingly, the Norwegian government 
was able to ignore the demands of the industry in international negotiations.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Icelandic interest groups retained or even increased 
their power. This was evident in 1998, when the Icelandic government cancelled the 1989 
agreement. Interviewees in Iceland reveal that the agreement was cancelled because Icelandic 
fisheries interests, specifically the Vessel Owners, were fed up with difficult relations with 
Norway over the cod fishery in the Barents Sea. The Vessel Owners argued that Norway’s 
share of the capelin stock and their access to Icelandic waters were great. The Vessel Owners 
supported their claim by arguing that since, there was very limited capelin fishery within the 
Norwegian zone around Jan Mayen, thus Norway did not have rights to an 11% share. There 
was initial opposition to these demands, and an Icelandic bureaucrat said he thought 
canceling the agreement was risky. “I did not think we could get a better agreement,” he said. 
“I thought we had a good agreement before and I thought the risk of not having an agreement 
was bad.”42 But this prediction turned out to be wrong as the Norwegian share was further cut 
by three percentage points, from 11% to 8%. 
Interest group influence on the capelin negotiations has varied over time, reflecting 
the changes in the relationship between the government and interest groups in the domestic 
arena. Most notably, the Norwegian interest groups have lost power over the past 20 years 
and are, as a result, less able to achieve policy decisions favorable to their own interests. The 
Icelandic interest groups have on the other hand remained powerful and their influence is 
clearly felt among the negotiators, resulting in a favorable outcome for Iceland in two of the 
three negotiations.  
                                                          
38. Anonymous 1980. 
39. Paulsen 1989. 
40. Paulsen 1989. 
41. Paulsen 1989. 
42. Personal interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat. Interview conducted in Iceland, October 13, 1998. 
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Herring 
 
Until the late 1960s, the Norwegian-Icelandic herring stock was the second most important 
fishery in Iceland and Norway. The fishery collapsed in the late 1960s and after 25 years of 
rebuilding the stock in Norwegian and Russian waters, herring made a sudden reappearance 
in international waters in 1994. This led to Iceland, Faeroe Islands, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Germany and the UK reporting catches in 1995.43 Negotiations were marked by heavy 
interest group representation on both sides. The Icelandic interest groups pushed for using 
historical rights as a baseline, as the stock had been fished primarily in Icelandic waters 
before its collapse. Norwegians pushed for zonal attachment, as 90% of the stock was found 
within its waters. In the end, historical rights won out which benefited Iceland and gave it a 
far larger share of the stock than zonal attachment would have done.  
During the first negotiations Norges Fiskarlag became increasingly disillusioned by 
what they perceived as the Norwegian government’s willingness to bargain away too much of 
herring stocks.  As a result, they refused to send a delegate to the negotiations. Chairman 
Oddmund Bye said on that occasion, “Norges Fiskarlag cannot participate in negotiating an 
agreement that results in a substantial loss for Norwegian fishermen.”44 As one interest group 
interviewee said, “We thought that Norway should have gotten about 80 or 90% [of the 
TAC]. In international negotiations there is always give and take, but we got 56%.”45 Norges 
Fiskarlag’s resignation from the Norwegian delegation, gave the government freer reign in 
negotiating the agreement, which was clearly a priority. The Icelandic interest groups were 
equally disappointed in how little the Norwegians wanted to offer. According to Kristján 
Ragnarsson, chairman of the Vessel Owners, Norway offered Iceland and the Faeroese 100-
130 thousand tons less than what they fished the previous year.46 But the recognition of 
historical rights was a big victory for Iceland and its interest groups. 
 Norges Fiskarlag did participate in the Norwegian delegation during the 1997 
negotiations. This round added the European Union (EU) to the existing agreement. The 7% 
share of the TAC given to the EU was achieved by Norway reducing its share by 5 
percentage points and Iceland by 2 percentage points. Hence, Norway reduced its share by 
about 7.5% and Iceland by 11.7%. The Icelandic interest groups were vehemently opposed to 
giving anything to the European Union and in the end, the cost of including the EU in the 
agreement was borne by the Norwegians, whose interest groups already were dissatisfied 
with a small Norwegian share from the year before. But the protests by Norges Fiskarlag 
were for naught as the political cost for the Norwegian government ignoring the interest 
group’s demands at that point were limited.  
 
Cod 
 
Cod is the most important fishery in Norway and Iceland; generating more than 30% of the 
value of fish exports in both Iceland and Norway. The economic importance of the fishery 
gives interest groups a strong incentive to influence government policy, both domestically 
and internationally. In 1993, facing declining catches at home, Icelandic trawlers began to 
fish for Arctic cod in international waters between the economic zones of Norway and 
Russia, the so-called Loop Hole. Icelandic vessel owners initiated this push into the high 
seas, claiming historical rights dating back to the early 1950s. This claim was tenuous at best 
                                                          
43. Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 1999. 
44. Anonymous 1996b.  
45. Personal interview with a Norwegian interest group leader. Interview conducted in Norway, June 16, 1999. 
46. Anonymous 1996a. 
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as the Icelandic fishery in the area was never of much significance. The conflict was highly 
political from the start and the distance between the parties was great. The first round of 
negotiations in 1993 failed completely, the negotiations broke down again in 1996. Finally, 
with a new government in power in Norway in 1997, the negotiations resumed and were 
concluded in 1999.  
Following the resumption of the negotiations in 1997, interest groups were kept out of 
the negotiations altogether, mainly because the Norwegian interest groups opposed any 
agreement with Iceland. In interviews, the Icelandic interest group leaders seemed much less 
bothered by this than their Norwegian counterparts. This was because the Icelandic interest 
groups work more closely with the government in general. Icelandic interest group leaders 
were relatively content with the agreement, while Norges Fiskarlag was furious. In 
conclusion it can be said that Iceland and Norway were able to reach an agreement by 
excluding Norges Fiskarlag from the delegation. Had the government included Norges 
Fiskarlag, it would have been much more difficult for the government to solve the conflict as 
Norges Fiskarlag was completely opposed to any agreement with Icelanders. But leaving the 
interest groups behind gave the Norwegian government more leeway to solve the conflict 
without having to fight a simultaneous battle with the interest group. And the Norwegian 
government was able to do so, as by this point, the ability of the fishing industry to levy 
political costs is practically none.  
 
Oceanic Redfish 
 
The negotiations over oceanic redfish were markedly less political than the other negotiations 
discussed here, primarily because this is a relatively new fishery, with Iceland reporting its 
first catches in 1989 and Norway in 1990. In addition, the conflict was primarily between 
Iceland and Greenland on the one hand and Russia on the other. The Soviet Union was the 
first nation to begin fishing from the stock in 1982 and Russia was loath to give up its 
historical rights to the fishery. Given the newness of the fishery, and its location far from 
shore, little scientific information existed on the stock, which made the negotiations 
problematic initially. The most remarkable thing about the negotiations is that Iceland and 
Greenland, the two coastal states in question, agreed to refer the management of the stock, 
including any share of the stock found in domestic waters, to the North East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), a regional fisheries organization. The organization 
established a working group that was led by a Norwegian official from the Directorate of 
Fisheries and the goal of the working group was to develop suggestions about how to divide 
the stock among participants in the fishery. Norway was a small participant in the fishery and 
a high-seas fishing state, and thus not a major player in the negotiations. Interest groups were 
included in the negotiations over oceanic redfish, but their preferences and actions remain 
unclear. In Iceland, the Vessel Owners were happy with the agreement.47 There is no 
information on Norges Fiskarlag’s reaction to the agreement.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 
The literature on the domestic influence on international cooperation has paid scant attention 
to the impact of interest groups on the distributive outcomes of negotiations. In the context of 
cooperation between Iceland and Norway over shared fish stocks, it is clear that interest 
groups can and do directly influence the outcome of the negotiations by restricting the 
alternatives available for the negotiators. The evidence presented here suggests that the 
                                                          
47. Anonymous 1996c. 
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presence of powerful interest groups results in greater TAC. This interest group influence is 
independent of political institutions such as the legislature. As Tarar shows, highly 
constrained negotiators facing negotiators who are less constrained have a bargaining 
advantage.48 This is clearly the case between Iceland and Norway.  
The fact that the Icelandic interest groups have remained strong during 20 years of 
negotiations while Norges Fiskarlag’s influence has steadily declined has resulted in an 
increasingly skewed bargaining position for Norway. As a result, Iceland has been able to get 
its way in deciding which solution concept to use, which in turn has given Iceland a greater 
share of the resources than strict application of zonal attachment should indicate. By being 
able to influence the choice of either historical rights or zonal attachment, Icelandic 
negotiators have secured a more favorable outcome for Icelandic fishermen in the 
negotiations.  
Only during the first Capelin negotiations that ended in 1980 are the interest groups 
on both sides equally powerful. In the early 1980s, the power of the Norwegian interest 
groups began to wane, leading to lesser ability to influence the Norwegian bargaining 
position. As detailed earlier, the Icelandic Vessel Owners retained or increased its power with 
regards to the government, which meant they were able to put more constraints on the 
Icelandic negotiating position, i.e. allowing negotiators limited room to offer and accept 
bargains. After that the Icelandic interest groups have an advantage, leading to better 
outcomes for Iceland in each of the subsequent negotiations.  
The research shows that when explaining the distributional outcome of international 
negotiations, it is important to look at the role of domestic groups in the bargaining process. 
In addition this research shows the importance of broadening the question of international 
cooperation to explore systematically the actual outcomes of negotiations, not only whether 
or not states cooperate. By doing so, we expand the range of the dependent variable and can 
thus better identify the different influences that come into play in international cooperation.  
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